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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the role of ethnicity in shaping the character of Kenya’s political par-
ties and its party system since 1992. Drawing on a constructivist conception of ethnicity, it 
uses a framework of comparison derived from Donald Horowitz and distinguishes be-
tween three party types: the mono-ethnic party, the multi-ethnic alliance type and the 
multi-ethnic integrative type. It shows that although Kenyan parties have increasingly in-
corporated diverse communities, they have consistently failed to bridge the country’s 
dominant ethnic cleavages. Consequently, all of Kenya’s significant parties represent eth-
nic coalitions of convenience and commitment and, thus, ethnic parties. The paper further 
states that the country’s post-2007 political environment is a by-product of the omnipres-
ence of this party type. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Einfluss von Ethnizität auf politische Parteien in Kenia 
Afrikanische Parteien wurden in der Literatur nur sehr vereinzelt systematisch untersucht. 
Allerdings wird generell Ethnizität eine große Bedeutung bei der Klassifizierung afri-
kanischer Parteien zugemessen. Die vorliegende Analyse bestätigt dies für Kenia. Auf der 
Grundlage von Donald Horowitz’ Theorie über politischen Wettbewerb in multiethni-
schen Gesellschaften werden in der Untersuchung des Einflusses von Ethnizität auf politi-
sche Parteien drei Parteitypen unterschieden: die monoethnische Partei, die multiethni-
sche Allianz und die multiethnische integrative Partei. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass seit 
1992 alle politisch signifikanten Parteien kurzlebige ethnische Koalitionen darstellen. 
Diese haben seit Einführung des Mehrparteiensystems Konfliktlinien zwischen ethnischen 
Gruppen verstärkt. Gewaltsame ethnische Konflikte, wie sie nach den Wahlen im Dezem-
ber 2007 zu beobachten waren, sind eine Folgeerscheinung dieser Koalitionen. 
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1 Introduction 
The 2007 Kenyan elections provided one of the rare instances on the African continent 
where the outcome of both the presidential and parliamentary elections could not be antici-
pated and where a change of government was a realistic possibility (Bogaards 2003). Yet the 
aftermath represented a setback on the country’s journey to democratic consolidation, some-
thing which many had already taken for granted after Kenya’s first democratic and peaceful 
handover of power from one government to another in 2002. Violent clashes between the 
Kenyan police forces and opposition supporters as well as strong ethnic rhetoric by all major 
political players1 dramatically underlined the high salience of ethnicity in Kenyan politics. 
This study illustrates that these clashes and conflicts are a direct outcome of the particular 
type of party which is prevalent in Kenya. Accordingly, it pursues the following research 
question: Which type(s) of political parties exist in Kenya? Which type, if any, is prevalent in 
Kenya’s party system? In order to arrive at answers, the study will initially outline a classifica-
                                                     
1  Both President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga accused each other of attempted genocide in vari-
ous TV interviews. Kenya Television Network, January 2, 2008. 
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tion scheme derived from Horowitz’s theory of political competition in ethnically seg-
mented societies (Horowitz 2000). It includes the following party types: The mono-ethnic 
party (representing one group), the multi-ethnic alliance, and the multi-ethnic integrative 
party (representing various groups respectively). Subsequently, the scheme will be applied 
to parties that were significant in Kenya between 1991 and 2007. In order to identify politi-
cally relevant parties, the study uses the Laakso and Taagepera effective number of parties 
index.2 The study distinguishes between three periods: Firstly, a period of fission (1991 to 
1997), in which multi-ethnic alliances disintegrated. In this period the effective number of 
parties ranged between 4.1 (1992 parliamentary election) and 4.5 (1997 parliamentary elec-
tion). Secondly, a period of fusion (1998 to 2002), in which this trend was reversed. In this 
period parties merged into multi-ethnic alliances and the effective number of parties de-
clined from 4.5 to 2.9 (2002 parliamentary election) accordingly. Finally, a period of fluidity 
(2003 until today), in which the position of parties in and out of government was increas-
ingly difficult to determine and in which party alliances were no longer made up of parties 
but of party wings and individuals. The analysis will demonstrate that all of Kenya’s signifi-
cant parties overwhelmingly follow Horowitz’s logic of ethnic coalitions of convenience and 
commitment and thus represent ethnic parties. 
2 Framework for Comparison: Ethnicity, Party Types and Indicators 
2.1 Ethnicity 
Although there is agreement about the significance of ethnicity in African political life, there 
are conceptual disagreements about the term. There has long been a debate in political sci-
ence between “primordalists,” who see ethnicity as a static relic of a primordial African past, 
and representatives of a more constructivist notion, who regard ethnicity as the product of 
perceived norms and identity, which has the potential to change over time (Ogude 2002, 
Berman et al. 2004). This study draws on the concept of ethnicity as outlined by Nelson Kas-
fir, which is closer to the latter. For Kasfir 
[E]thnicity contains objective characteristics associated with common ancestry, such as 
language, territory, cultural practices and the like. These are perceived by both insiders 
and outsiders as important indicators of identity, so that they can become the bases for 
mobilizing social solidarity and which in certain situations result in political activity. 
(Kasfir 1976: 77) 
Thus Kasfir proposes a fluid concept of ethnicity: Actors’ self-definition in any given situa-
tion might or might not involve ethnic considerations. The strength of his conception of eth-
                                                     
2  The Laakso and Taagepera effective number of parties index gives increasing weight to parties that receive 
higher proportions of the vote. It is calculated by taking the inverse of the sum of the squared proportions of 
the vote or of the seats. For an application of the index, see Chhibber and Kollman (2004:4-9). 
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nicity is grounded in the fact that it allows for specification when applied to different politi-
cal scenarios: Ethnic identities may play a significant role—for example, during an election 
campaign—but they may equally cease to matter. Recent quantitative studies undertaken by 
Afrobarometer encourage a situational approach towards ethnicity. In a cross-national study 
conducted in various African countries, Bannon and others have found that the political sa-
lience of ethnicity is heavily dependent on the national context as well as on the intensity of 
political competition (Bannon et al. 2004). 
2.2 Party Types and Indicators 
The framework for analyzing Kenyan political parties in the context of this study includes 
three different party types, the mono-ethnic, the multi-ethnic alliance and the multi-ethnic 
integrative party. These types are derived from a typology originally composed by Diamond 
and Gunther (2001:1-39), which is designed to classify political parties on a global scale. The 
typology used in this study is a limited version of the original Diamond and Gunther frame-
work.3 The existence of other party types in Africa, such as the programmatic party, is not 
denied here; instead, the typology provides a mere starting point for analyzing Kenyan po-
litical parties. If empirical evidence showed that Kenya’s political parties did not fit our 
framework of comparison, the development of further party types would be required. How-
ever, as the discussion below will demonstrate, such considerations are unwarranted. In or-
der to distinguish between the three party types under consideration, the following indica-
tors will be used: 
- Leadership Composition. In this study party leadership refers to the top positions in a po-
litical party including the chairman, the vice-chairman (or vice-chairmen depending on 
the party’s constitution), the secretary-general, and—where data is available—the na-
tional treasurer.4 Looking at a variety of personalities at the top of a party brings the ad-
vantage of being able to decipher the setup of the party in greater detail than when sim-
ply looking at the party’s presidential candidate or the chairman, as is often the case in 
the literature on African parties. 
- Party Factions. Factions exist in any party. Whether or not factions form around ethnic 
groups, programmatic ideas, generational groups, or merely powerful individuals un-
derlines the salience of ethnicity in party politics. 
                                                     
3  Ethnicity-based parties in the original typology have been modified for present purposes: Diamond and Gun-
ther’s Congress Party Type is divided into two different parties, the multi-ethnic alliance and the multi-ethnic 
integrative party. This has been done to analyze the salience of ethnicity in Kenyan parties in a more thor-
ough way. 
4  This study outlines all party leadership positions as they were reported by the Daily Nation, Kenya’s major 
newspaper. Unfortunately, in some rare cases position holders could not be identified, not even by the re-
spective party headquarters in Kenya. 
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- National Coverage. This study measures the ability of a party to reach out by comparing 
the number of parliamentary candidates nationwide and per province to the total num-
ber of constituencies nationwide and per province. 
- Party Nationalization Scores (PNS) and Electoral Cleavages. Party Nationalization Scores 
(PNS) provide a useful means of comparing different parties’ electoral support nation-
wide.5 These alone, however, cannot identify whether or not a party’s vote is dominated 
by a particular group, especially in cases where districts or provinces are populated by 
diverse communities. Therefore, PNS must be analyzed in connection with a region’s 
ethnic composition and election results. It is necessary to note that neither mono-ethnic 
parties nor multi-ethnic parties of any type have to claim the total support or even the 
majority support of the group they represent. According to Horowitz, “it is how the 
party’s support is distributed, and not how the ethnic group’s support is distributed, 
that is decisive” in determining a party’s character (Horowitz 2000: 293). 
How then can differences between different party types be observed empirically? The 
mono-ethnic party promotes the interests of one ethnic group and openly appeals to this 
group to unite politically under its party banner. Accordingly, in terms of its leadership 
composition, it is homogenous. All its leading figures come either from one ethnic group or 
from ethnic groups with cultural similarities. Consequently, its party factions do not repre-
sent ethnic factionalism but rather generational differences (“Young Turks” versus “Old 
Guard”) or power struggles between individuals within the party. The party’s ability to field 
candidates is restricted to the area(s) where the group it represents is located. Equally, its 
PNS are comparatively low; election results normally indicate rather quickly which ethnic 
groups it represents. 
With regard to multi-ethnic parties, there is currently a growing trend in the literature to re-
gard most of Africa’s relevant political parties as such (Erdmann 2007). In this study two 
types of multi-ethnic parties will be used, the multi-ethnic alliance and the multi-ethnic in-
tegrative party, both of which represent various ethnic communities. The two basic differ-
ences between the two multi-ethnic types are their respective motivation and degree of in-
ternal stability: The alliance type corresponds to the logic of Donald Horowitz’s coalitions of 
convenience and coalitions of commitment. A coalition of convenience is formed with the sole mo-
tivation of gaining a parliamentary majority. Coalitions of commitment indicate more amicable 
relations, yet anticipated gains on election day again provide the key impetus for communi-
ties to unite. Driven by such strategic considerations, the alliance type makes extensive use 
of “ethnic arithmetic”: It tries to include as many groups as necessary in order to secure elec-
toral victory. Consequently, these types of ethnic coalitions prove to be internally fragile and 
short-lived. By contrast, the integrative type’s purposes transcend election day. This corre-
                                                     
5  The PNS is measured by calculating the Gini coefficient of a party’s electoral support and subtracting the co-
efficient from 1. The closer the PNS is to 1, the more the party’s support can be seen as national. The closer it 
is to 0, the less its support is nationwide. For an application, see Jones and Mainwaring (2003). 
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sponds to Horowitz’s logic of permanent coalitions of ethnic parties. The integrative party aims 
to form a long-lasting political force in which two conditions are fulfilled: Firstly, it bridges 
its country’s dominant ethnic cleavages (past or present) by incorporating influential com-
munity leaders from both sides of the cleavage into its leadership structure. Secondly, the in-
tegrative party is formed long before election day and survives electoral defeats as well as 
leadership contests without any major changes (splits and mergers) in the groups that make 
up the party. By staying together as a united political force it demonstrates that it has over-
come the divisive logic of ethnic arithmetic. Within the integrative party ethnicity no longer 
leads to exclusion; thus, the party no longer represents an “ethnic party” as conventionally 
understood in the literature and as represented by the mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic alliance 
party. Given the diverse social fabric of African societies, Africa’s lack of an industrial revo-
lution, and the continent’s more or less limited ability to design social welfare policies, the 
integrative party is instead the closest an African party gets to the model of the catchall 
party found in Europe and the United States.6
Accordingly, with regard to party leadership composition, the alliance and the integrative 
type are rather similar; yet in contrast to the alliance type, the integrative party transcends 
the country’s dominant ethnic cleavages. In terms of party factions, the alliance type is sig-
nificantly less stable: It suffers from breakups and mergers preceding and succeeding par-
liamentary elections, and party splits regularly accompany leadership elections. As the alli-
ance type is made up of groups which act according to individual group interests and as 
leadership elections ultimately produce more losers than winners, the alliance type is con-
stantly in flux. Consequently, the alliance type is fractured by a variety of ethnic factions, 
which constantly have the potential to destroy the party. The integrative party is also made 
up of ethnic factions; however, it aims for equal representation of all the ethnic groups that 
make up the party in the long run. In addition, while in an alliance party ethnic factions op-
pose each other and try to dominate the party, in an integrative party they complement each 
other by reaching out to their respective communities—while still refraining from excluding 
other communities from running the party. In an integrative party, factions may emerge in 
relation to generational differences or powerful individuals as they do in the mono-ethnic 
party. Within the alliance type, such divisions are clearly overshadowed by ethnic factional-
ism. Both types of parties have the capacity to field candidates nationwide, though the alli-
ance type might focus on its “home regions.” Election results further reflect this: the alliance 
type has distinguishable strongholds; the integrative type’s support is evenly spread. The 
PNS of both types are higher than those of the ethnic party, yet the PNS of the integrative 
type can be expected to be higher than those of its alliance counterpart. 
One should note that it might be difficult to distinguish the alliance type from the integra-
tive type in the event that the party under scrutiny is the party in government. The vast lit-
                                                     
6  For a model of the catchall party see Wollinetz Steven (2002). 
10 Elischer: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya 
erature on neopatrimonialism illustrates that access to state resources is frequently used to 
buy political support in order to secure one’s claim to power (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997, Erdmann and Engel 2007). Given its ability to do this at any time, a governing party 
might often appear to be internally stable. Its factions might appear not to be ethnically op-
posed. This is not the result of the party’s seemingly integrative character but rather of 
“sponsorship from above.” In that case the question of whether or not its leadership struc-
ture bridges the country’s ethnic cleavages is even more important. A better indicator here 
might be the composition of the cabinet rather than party leadership. Table 1 summarizes all 
party types including their indicators. 
Table 1: Party Types and Indicators 
 Ethnic Party Alliance Party Integrative Party 
Leadership Composition Mono-ethnic Multi-ethnic Multi-ethnic 
Bridges dominant ethnic cleavages
Party Factions Personalistic Factions 
Young Turks versus Old Guards
Opposing Ethnic Factions Supplementary Ethnic Factions 
Personalistic Factions 
Young Turks versus Old Guards 
Ability to Reach Out Regionally Limited Medium to Nationwide Nationwide 
Party Nationalization Score Low Medium to High High 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
3 Ethnicity and Political Parties in Kenya 
3.1 Ethnic Composition of Kenya and Its Provinces 
Before applying our framework, it is worth noting the ethnic makeup of Kenya and its 
dominant cleavages. Tables 2 and 3 provide greater detail on the ethnic composition of the 
country and its provinces. The subsequent section will outline the historical relationships be-
tween the country’s different communities. 
Table 2: Ethnic Composition of Kenya 
Ethnic Groups Share of Total Population
(in Percent) 
Kikuyu 21 
Luhya 14 
Luo 12 
Kalenjin 12 
Kamba 11 
Kisii   6 
Meru   5 
Mijikenda   5 
Masai   2 
Others/Smaller communities* 12 
* Individually these groups account for less than 1% of the population. 
Source: Schröder, Günther (1998: Annex 8). 
 
Elischer: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya 11 
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of Kenya’s Provinces 
Province Ethnic Composition Comments 
Nairobi 47% Kikuyu 
16% Luhya 
15% Luo 
15% Kamba 
Kenya’s most ethnically diverse region 
Coast Smaller coastal communities 96% of Kenya’s coastal communities live in Coast 
Eastern 55% Kamba 
39% Meru/Embu 
87% of all Kamba live in Eastern 
97% of all Meru/Embu live in Eastern 
North-Eastern 96% Somali 95% of all Somali live in North-Eastern 
Rift Valley 51% Kalenjin 
15% Kikuyu 
7% Masai 
95% of all Kalenjin live in Rift Valley 
97% of all Masai live in Rift Valley 
Western 88% Luhya 80% of all Luhya live in Western 
Nyanza 63% Luo 
31% Kisii 
87% of all Luo live in Nyanza 
95% of all Kissi live in Nyanza 
Source: Nellis, John (1974: 8-14). 
3.2 Cleavages in Historical Perspective 
In the run-up to Kenyan independence two major political parties emerged, the Kenyan Af-
rican Democratic Union (KADU) and its counterpart, the Kenyan African National Union 
(KANU). The former was led by Ronald Ngala (Coastal), Masinde Muliro (Luhya), and 
Daniel arap Moi (Kalenjin) and driven by Kenya’s smaller communities and large parts of 
the Luhya, whose leaders advocated a federal constitutional setup (majimboism) in order to 
contain Kikuyu dominance. Kenya’s two largest communities were represented in the latter 
and led by Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and two Luos, Tom Mboya (Luo) and Oginga Odinga 
(Ajulu 2002). After KADU lost Kenya’s first general election it merged with KANU. The rift 
between the smaller communities and the Kikuyu governing elite around Kenyatta (“The 
Family”) surfaced again during the succession struggle over the presidency in the last years 
of Kenyatta’s life. In this battle for the presidency the KANU faction around Vice-President 
Daniel arap Moi proved successful in resisting the onslaught of the GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, 
and Meru) welfare association; this facilitated Moi’s succession to the presidency after Ken-
yatta’s death.7 Following a failed coup d’état against his government, Moi radically altered 
the composition of key cabinet positions in 1985 and filled them largely with members of the 
Kalenjin and smaller communities (Widner 1992:165-166). Thus from the early days of po-
litical activity onwards a cleavage developed between the larger and smaller communities in 
general and between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in particular. 
An additional cleavage between the Kikuyu and the Luo emerged during the reign of Ken-
yatta. The assassination of Tom Mboya, one of Kenya’s most prominent Luo leaders, who 
                                                     
7  Within KANU GEMA represented the party wing associated with the Kikuyu elite and Kenyatta. GEMA 
tried to alter the constitutional provision according to which the vice-president automatically assumes the 
presidency in case of the president’s death. For detailed information on GEMA and its campaign against Moi, 
see Throup and Hornsby (1998: 20-23). 
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was regarded as the political heir of Kenyatta, under mysterious circumstances in 1969 
(Goldworthy 1982) and the detention of Oginga Odinga after his breakaway from KANU 
under the umbrella of the Kenya’s People’s Union (KPU) led to a sense of betrayal among 
the political elite of the Luo community (Geertzel 1970:7-11). In the run-up to independence, 
KANU’s Luo elite had boycotted the first African-led government until Kenyatta had been 
released from prison. In their eyes they had withheld their own political aspirations and 
thus facilitated Kenyatta’s claim to power in the late 1950s. By the late 1960s their leaders 
were either imprisoned or had fallen victim to politically motivated murder (Ajulu 2002). 
Table 4 summarizes the historical rise of Kenya’s cleavages. 
Table 4: Summary: Historical Cleavages in Kenyan Politics 
Cleavage Issue Political Manifestation Leading Figures 
Small communities versus  
large communities: 
Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana,  
Samburu versus Luo, Kikuyu 
Fear of domination by 
larger communities 
Federalism 
KADU versus KANU KADU: 
Daniel arap Moi (Kalenjin)
Martin Shikuku (Luhya) 
Robert Ngala  
(Coastal Communities) 
Masinde Muliro (Luhya) 
KANU: 
Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) 
Oginga Odinga (Luo) 
Tom Mboya (Luo) 
Luo versus Kikuyu Presidency and  
Political Power 
Mboya versus Kenyatta
KPU versus KANU 
Mboya versus Kikuyu elite
Odinga and Kenyatta 
Kikuyu versus Kalenjin Succession of Kenyatta Moi wing of KANU  
versus GEMA 
Moi/Kibaki 
GEMA leaders 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
3.3 Political Parties and Ethnicity 
The following discussion will examine Kenya’s party types in greater detail. It will first look 
at the period of fission, covering those political parties significant between 1991 and 1997. 
During this period a variety of multi-ethnic parties collapsed, which resulted in the appear-
ance of mono-ethnic ones. The effective number of parties index in this period ranges from 
4.1 (1992 election) to 4.5 (1997 elections). Politically significant parties accordingly include 
the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K); the Forum for the Restora-
tion of Democracy-Asili (FORD-A); the Democratic Party (DP); the Kenyan African National 
Union (KANU); and after the 1997 elections, the National Development Party (NDP) and the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP). Table 5 and Table 6 summarize each party’s national cover-
age and electoral performance during this time period. 
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Table 5: Parties’ National Coverage in the 1992 and 1997 Elections as Percentage of Seats 
Contested (in Percent) 
Province FORD-K 
1992 
FORD-K
1997 
FORD-A
1992 
FORD-A
1997 
DP 
1992
DP 
1997
NDP
1997 
SDP 
1997 
KANU 
1992/1997
Nairobi 100 87 100 63 100 100 100 89 100 
Coast 89 66 85 10 100 81 81 62 100 
North Eastern 90 36 80 27 100 63 73 36 100 
Eastern 81 25 90 6 91 83 47 67 100 
Central 60 10 96 24 92 90 24 55 100 
Rift Valley 40 42 48 8 59 52 29 25 100 
Western 85 95 85 42 90 38 22 25 100 
Nyanza 100 29 45 3 55 34 94 63 100 
Total 74 50 76 16 83 64 52 49 100 
Source: 1992 parliamentary election data compiled from David Throup and Charles Hornsby (1998: Appen-
dix 2). 1997 election data is compiled from Electoral Commission of Kenya, 1997 Parliamentary Results 
by Constituency. 
Table 6: Parties’ Parliamentary Electoral Performance in 1992 and 1997 Elections 
Province FORD-K 
1992 
FORD-K 
1997 
FORD-A
1992 
FORD-A
1997 
DP 
1992
DP 
1997
NDP
1997 
SDP 
1997 
KANU 
1992 
KANU
1997 
Nairobi 22% 6% 37% 1% 19% 32% 20% 12% 17% 22% 
Coast 19% 4% 10% 0% 15% 16% 12% 7% 54% 53% 
North Eastern 11% 4% 11% 7% 5% 5% 0% 1% 64% 60% 
Eastern 6% 4% 9% 3% 43% 24% 2% 23% 39% 40% 
Central 5% 0% 50% 2% 36% 48% 3% 11% 4% 11% 
Rift Valley 9% 9% 25% 0% 15% 25% 3% 1% 48% 59% 
Western 19% 44% 33% 3% 6% 1% 3% 1% 40% 47% 
Nyanza 70% 10% 1% 0% 7% 4% 48% 3% 17% 30% 
Total 49% 10% 24% 1% 30% 22% 11% 4% 30% 39% 
Seats  31 17 31 1 23 39 21 15 100 110 
PNS .56 .45 .60 .42 .61 .57 .42 .48 .68 .76 
Source: 1992 parliamentary election data compiled from David Throup and Charles Hornsby (1998: Appen-
dix 2). 1997 election data is compiled from Electoral Commission of Kenya, 1997 Parliamentary Results 
by Constituency. 
3.3.1 The Period of Fission: Kenya’s Political Parties between 1992 and 1997 
FORD-Kenya’s Long Decline 
Since its split from the original Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), FORD-
Kenya has experienced a constant decline, transforming from a major opposition force in 1992 
to a comparatively small mono-ethnic party by late 1997. Starting out as the larger part of 
FORD, it initially accommodated Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Meru, and Somali members within its 
leadership.8 Soon, however, FORD-K followed in the footsteps of FORD. In September 1993 
Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara left FORD-K; they accused Odinga of having kidnapped the 
party and of running it like a Luo kingdom. Muite’s public support for Kikuyu unity and his 
                                                     
8  Daily Nation, May 22, 1992. 
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constant appeals to fellow Kikuyu leaders to unite politically illustrate the ethnic undertones 
that accompanied the FORD-K split.9 With the Kikuyu wing of the party gone and the take-
over of the party leadership by Kijana Wamalwa (Luhya) after Odinga Oginga’s death, FORD-
K leadership was increasingly drawn from Nyanza and Western Province.10 This, however, 
did not lead to less controversial intraparty relations. As Raila Odinga was steadily emerging 
as the dominant political figure among the Luo, the relationship between him and Wamalwa 
deteriorated.11 In March 1995, FORD-K MPs dropped Raila from the influential parliamentary 
Public Accounts Committee after the party headquarters was cleansed of employees allied to 
him.12 Meanwhile, Raila increasingly advocated a strategic Luo-Kikuyu alliance and chal-
lenged Wamalwa more than once to resign over the leader’s alleged involvement in the 
Goldenberg scandal.13 The party’s steady slide into chaos became unstoppable at the end of 
1995 when Raila unsuccessfully staged a coup and declared himself chairman of FORD-K.14 
Table 7 illustrates the ethnic factionalism which ultimately tore FORD-K apart. 
Table 7: Ethnic Factionalism inside FORD-K 
Division Factions Issue Outcome 
Luo versus Kikuyu Oginga Odinga (Luo) versus 
Paul Muite (Kikuyu) 
Cooperation with KANU
Odinga’s leadership 
Muite and Imanyara exit party Æ  
end of Kikuyu participation 
Luo versus Luhya Raila Odinga (Luo) versus  
Wamalwa (Luhya) 
Party leadership Raila exits partyÆ  
end of Luo participation in FORD-K
Source: Author’s compilation. 
In January 1997 the Raila faction quit the party and defected to the National Development 
Party. Shortly after the dissolution of parliament in late 1997, all Luo FORD-K MPs followed 
Raila.15 This exodus and the further decline of nationwide support also manifested itself in 
FORD-K’s ability to field parliamentary candidates and in its electoral performance. Both 
indicators display the party’s diminishing ability to reach out to any province other than 
Nairobi, Coastal, and Western by 1997. The declining PNS underline the increasing overall 
ethnic bias towards the Luhya. 
FORD-Asili: The Prisoners of Kenneth Matiba 
In the period of multipartyism, FORD-A, at least initially, posed a greater challenge to the Moi 
regime than its FORD-K counterpart. Its presidential candidate and party leader, Kenneth 
Matiba, not only symbolized the struggle against Moi’s autocracy but also came a close second 
in the presidential race. The party’s leadership composition conforms to the way the Kenyan 
                                                     
9  Daily Nation, May 9, 1994. 
10  Daily Nation, March 21, 1994. 
11  Daily Nation, March 8, 1994. 
12  Daily Nation, November 24, 1995; Daily Nation, March 29, 1995. 
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14  Daily Nation, November 30, 1995. 
15  Daily Nation, November 13, 1997. 
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media portrayed FORD-A: a party representing first and foremost Kikuyu and Luhya interests 
and in particular the interests of the “common man” among the two communities (Troup and 
Hornsby 1998:136). Some Kenyan commentators even referred to it as a “ghetto party.”16 Yet 
instead of taking on KANU and President Moi, Matiba continuously boycotted parliamentary 
debates, much to the disadvantage of his party, which lacked clear leadership throughout the 
1993 to 1997 period. In October 1994 Matiba single-handedly closed down FORD-A’s party 
headquarters and removed all documents and files without explaining his actions.17 His 1996 
shadow cabinet did not include any sitting FORD-A MPs.18 His consistent failure to hold party 
elections further damaged the image of FORD-A, as did the fact that he did not attend the 
meetings of the FORD-A National Executive Council.19 This at times led to his temporary and 
later permanent suspension from the party. Although the party at times suffered from Ki-
kuyu-Luhya rivalry,20 the main line of division clearly ran between Matiba and the rest.21 A 
general lack of confidence in FORD-A as well as Matiba’s decision not to stand again as 
FORD-A’s presidential candidate explain the party’s devastating 1997 election results. Central 
Province, Western Province, and Nairobi had been the strongholds of the party in 1992, both 
in terms of its capacity to field candidates and its electoral performance. By 1997 the party no 
longer commanded any political leverage and, with the exception of Western and Nairobi, 
was largely unable to present a feasible democratic alternative. 
The Democratic Party: The Beneficiaries of FORD-A’s Collapse 
While FORD-K and FORD-A emerged out of a large-scale opposition movement, the DP 
was founded by Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, a former Moi –ally, and a long-term KANU minis-
ter for finance. As an isolated advocate of political reforms inside KANU, Kibaki, together 
with Cabinet Minister John Keen, one of Kenya’s most vocal defenders of Masai interests, 
defected from the ruling party on December 24, 1991.22 Though the DP party leadership 
composition reached beyond Kikuyu membership and included Kamba, Kissi, and Masai,23 
many of its vocal members were previously high-ranking members of GEMA, such as for-
mer GEMA leader Njenga Karume and the architect of the “Change-the-Constitution” 
movement, Dixon Kihika, who became a sitting DP MP.24 The defection of John Keen back to 
KANU in 1996, which he justified by referring to the advice of Masai elders and the impor-
tance of a united Masai front within KANU, resulted in a narrowing of the Democratic 
                                                     
16  Daily Nation, June 5, 1993. 
17  Daily Nation, October 21, 1994. 
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20  For an example, see Daily Nation, July 26, 1993. 
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Party’s scope.25 Between 1993 and 1997 divisions between Kibaki and the representatives of 
Kamba DP MPs, namely Agnes Ndetei (Kamba) and Charity Ngilu (Kamba) became visible. 
Also, smaller communities such as the Meru, represented by MP Benjamin Ndubai, com-
plained about being sidelined by Kibaki’s Kikuyu entourage.26 The summary of factionalism 
inside the DP between 1991 and 1997 outlined in Table 8 shows that the DP became increas-
ingly mono-ethnic, particularly after the defection of Ndetei to KANU in 1996 and Ngilu’s 
takeover of the SDP in 1997. 
Table 8: Factionalism inside the DP 
Division Factions Issue Outcome 
- Masai - Defection back to KANU Æ 
exit of Masai 
- Kikuyu - - 
Kikuyu versus Kamba Kibaki (Kikuyu) versus  
Ngilu (Kamba) and Ndetei (Kamba)
Party leadership Defection of Ngilu Æ  
exit of the Kamba from DP 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
The electoral performance of the Democratic Party reflects the changes in its leadership com-
position over time. Like its fellow opposition parties, the DP was increasingly unable to field 
parliamentary candidates nationwide and consequently focused on its stronghold, the richer 
Kikuyu areas in Central Province and the Kikuyu diaspora in the Rift Valley. The party 
clearly profited from the meltdown of FORD-A, through which it managed to contain its 
losses elsewhere. Despite a decrease in its overall vote share (30% in 1992, 22% in 1997), the 
DP could increase its share of seats, while maintaining a similar party nationalization score. 
KANU: The Effects of Multipartyism 
KANU entered the arena of multiparty democracy as the party in power, the top leadership 
of which included Kalenjin, Luo, and Kikuyu. However, its party leadership composition 
does not give us an indication of the extent to which multipartyism impacted on KANU as 
the party did not hold any party elections between 1988 and 2001. The composition of the 
Kenyan cabinets of 1993 and 1998 is more indicative of which communities Moi tried to 
reach out to, both symbolically and in terms of patronage. The lion’s share of the 1993 cabi-
net in the multiparty era went to the Kamba, the Luhya, and the Kalenjin, who took four 
cabinet positions each. The Masai and the Kissi received two ministries respectively. The 
Luos and the Kikuyus received one. Several cabinet positions went to smaller communi-
ties.27 The 1997 cabinet saw the exit of the last Luo minister, a decrease in Kikuyu ministers 
from two to one, and subsequently, a rise in the number of Luhya and Kalenjin ministers.28
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26  Daily Nation, August 31, 1997. 
27  Daily Nation, January 14, 1993. 
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Internally, KANU was divided less by ethnicity than by disagreements over whether or not 
party elections should be held. This internal debate was heavily motivated by the looming 
departure of Moi from politics and the question of who would eventually succeed him. 
“KANU A,” led by Cabinet Minister Simon Nyachae (Kikuyu) and ole Ntimama (Masai), 
advocated internal party reforms, while “KANU B” brought together party hardliners such 
as Vice-President Saitoti (Masai), Secretary-General Joseph Kamotho (Kikuyu), and Cabinet 
Minister Nicholas Biwott (Kalenjin). 
On the outside KANU leaders, and in particular Moi, pursued a double strategy: On the one 
hand the party continuously stressed the idea that multiparty democracy had the potential 
to incite ethnic hatred and destroy the nation. On official occasions such as Kenyatta Day, 
Moi appealed to all political players to abstain from tribally inclined political statements and 
urged national unity, often referring to the notion of Kenyan nationhood.29 On the other 
hand, KANU strategically reached out to several selected communities in order to secure its 
numerical superiority come election day. This was largely pursued by cabinet ministers, 
who appealed to their communities to understand that their welfare was intrinsically linked 
to the welfare of KANU. In May 1994 Joshua Angatia (Luhya) announced that the Luhya 
community would strengthen its political bargaining power if Western Province became 
united with KANU.30 Around the same time Dalmas Otiento (Luo) declared that the only 
way for Luos to rule Kenya was through KANU; he urged the community to “return” to the 
party they had founded.31 Some went even further. Kenya’s minister for cooperative devel-
opment, Munyi (Meru), called on the Meru people to vote for KANU if they wanted to re-
ceive further governmental assistance.32 After the surprise takeover of the FORD-K leader-
ship by Wamalwa (Luhya), KANU’s stance in one of its strongholds was seriously endan-
gered. The party propaganda machinery reacted promptly: Cabinet Minister Masinde (Lu-
hya) and Luhya KANU MPs appealed to their community not to be tricked by FORD-K’s 
Luo membership base, which according to KANU was out to cheat the Luhya community.33 
Moi himself repeatedly warned against a revival of GEMA and told his Kalenjin community 
to be on guard against a looming Kikuyu attack on the presidency.34 Having championed 
the game of divide and rule during the era of the one-party state (Widner 1992), Moi applied 
this approach to multiparty politics, which proved successful. KANU managed to maintain 
its strongholds among the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and among the smaller tribes of Coastal 
Province. It did badly in the Kikuyu areas and among the Luo, which is not surprising and 
corresponds both to the party’s rhetoric and the allocation of cabinet positions. To overcome 
Kikuyu and Luo opposition was indeed the challenge KANU had to meet. They did so by 
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holding on to their Luhya and Kalenjin support and by relying on the party’s backing 
among the Somali people in North Eastern Province. Despite its comparatively high PNS, 
one should not forget that KANU was essentially an ethnic party, even though some of these 
figures might lead one to assume otherwise. Firstly, KANU MPs in the Rift Valley and parts 
of Eastern Province were in many cases elected unopposed due to the lack of alternative 
candidates, which meant that elections did not take place in these constituencies. This re-
sulted in slightly higher PNS than would have been the case if elections had taken place. 
Presidential election results for these constituencies show overwhelming support for Moi, 
and thus it is reasonable to argue that if elections had taken place, the number of votes for 
KANU would have been drastically higher these two provinces. This would have reduced 
the PNS, to the disadvantage of KANU, as the party’s votes would have been spread less 
equally nationwide. Secondly, KANU’s rhetoric throughout the 1993 to 1997 period played 
on ethnic divisions; more than any other party it thus professionalized the logic of ethnic 
arithmetic. Thirdly, the fact that ethnic factions within KANU were not fighting each other 
as intensely as factions in the opposition camp were can be easily explained by the financial 
opportunities of a party in government. Fourthly, and despite the absence of opposing eth-
nic factions within the party, KANU’s cabinet did not bridge the country’s ethnic cleavages, 
as the allocation of government positions to the Luo and Kikuyu demonstrate. In addition, 
frequent calls for majimboism by various KANU ministers further prove that in the mid-
1990s Kenyan history had come full circle: While in the run-up to independence the advo-
cates for majimboism (including the young Moi) had gathered in KADU, the same groups 
now dominated KANU. By contrast, the personalities and groups which had initially made 
up KANU (such as Oginga Odinga and the Luo) now made up the opposition. 
The Defected: NDP and SDP 
Election data from the 1997 elections, the only parliamentary elections the two parties con-
tested, confirm the ethnic character of the NDP and SDP, as do their respective leadership 
compositions. The leadership of the NDP was initially ethnically balanced; however, non-
Luo members quit the party rather quickly, which was reminiscent of the KPU’s destiny in 
the 1960s. The leadership composition of the SDP is unknown, yet on various occasions 
Charity Ngilu declared the party to represent first and foremost Kamba interests.35 Unsur-
prisingly, the NDP achieved a very impressive result in Nyanza Province, home of the Luo, 
while the SDP managed to get a sizeable portion of the vote in Eastern Province, home to the 
majority of the Kamba. 
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3.3.2 A Period of Fusion: Kenya between 1998 and 2003 
Though it had won the 1997 elections, KANU soon suffered even more from internal divi-
sions caused by the overarching question of who would eventually succeed Moi, whose end 
of power was now constitutionally no longer a matter of if but of when. KANU’s increas-
ingly endangered majority in parliament led to the merger of KANU with the NDP into 
New KANU. Simultaneously, the opposition merged into the National Rainbow Alliance 
(NARC). This had an impact on the number of politically significant parties after the 2002 
elections: The index declined from 4.5 (1997 elections) to 2.9 (2002 elections). Significant par-
ties included (New) KANU, NARC, and FORD-P.36 Both KANU and NARC were able to 
contest all constituencies. The 2002 parliamentary election results, as well as NARC’s and 
KANU’s PNS, are displayed in Table 9. 
Table 9: Parties’ 2002 Parliamentary Electoral Performance 
Province NARC KANU 2002
Nairobi 67% 17% 
Coast 42% 31% 
North Eastern 14% 54% 
Eastern 49% 24% 
Central 54% 23% 
Rift Valley 41% 47% 
Western 63% 20% 
Nyanza 51% 10% 
Total 50% 28% 
Seats  125 64 
PNS .84 .73 
Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya 2002, Results by Constituency. 
The Formation of New KANU and Its Downfall 
Despite its repeated electoral triumphs, KANU and President Moi reached a crisis point 
shortly after the 1997 elections. Criticism within KANU and reoccurring parliamentary de-
feats increasingly threatened the continuation of the Moi regime.37 In order to secure its po-
litical dominance, the governing party engaged in a parliamentary alliance with the NDP, 
which eventually resulted in the merger of the two parties in August 2001. After Raila and 
several other NDP members were promoted to the cabinet, the NDP formally joined the rul-
ing party (New KANU) in March 2002. Simultaneously, KANU elected its national party of-
ficials for the first time in over a decade. Its new leadership included Kalenjin, Kamba, Lu-
hya, Kikuyu, the coastal minority tribes, and the Luo.38 Shortly after the election of the new 
party leadership, Moi began to campaign for the new vice-chairman, Uhuru Kenyatta (Ki-
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kuyu), as KANU’s 2002 presidential candidate.39 Moi’s appointment of Musalia Mudavadi 
(Luhya) as vice-president at the constitutionally latest possible moment before the 2002 elec-
tion illustrates KANU’s electoral strategy for 2002, through which it hoped to combine the 
Kalenjin, the Luhya, and a large part of the Kikuyu vote.40 The outcome of Moi’s succession 
struggle and the anger this caused among KANU heavyweights led to the formation of the 
Rainbow Alliance, a rebel group within KANU under the leadership of KANU Secretary-
General Raila Odinga (Luo). It included former vice-president George Saitoti (Masai), for-
mer KANU secretary-general Joseph Kamotho (Kikuyu) as well as New KANU vice-
chairmen Katana Ngala (Coastal) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba).41 Two days before Ken-
yatta was officially elected KANU’s presidential candidate on October 14, 2002, the Rainbow 
Alliance formed the Liberal Democratic Party and, under the leadership of Raila Odinga, de-
fected to the opposition.42 Raila’s defection from New KANU after his disappointment over 
Moi’s bias towards the Kikuyu demonstrates that New KANU cannot be seen as an integra-
tive party, even though its party composition might one lead to such a conclusion. The 
party’s inclusion of the Luo community was short-lived and motivated by Moi’s desire to 
once again win the game of “ethnic arithmetic.” 
The Formation of NARC 
In the face of ongoing cooperation, and later the merger, between KANU and the NDP, the 
opposition followed suit. With no major changes amongst the opposition parties regarding 
their makeup, two lost elections in which all parties failed to overcome the logic of ethnic 
arithmetic, and a potentially rejuvenated New KANU on the horizon, Kibaki, Ngilu, and 
Wamalwa formed the National Alliance for Change (NAC) in January 2002. In August of the 
same year the NAC transformed itself into the National Alliance Party for Kenya (NAK), 
which shortly afterwards nominated Kibaki as its presidential candidate. With the emer-
gence of the Liberal Democratic Party, NAK further transformed itself into the National Al-
liance Rainbow Coalition (Ndegwa 2003). Thus, for the first time, Kenya’s opposition man-
aged to challenge KANU in all constituencies. Further, by bringing together Kibaki’s Kiku-
yus, Ngilu’s Kambas, Wamalwa’s and Musalia’s Luhyas, and Odinga’s Luos, it managed to 
beat New KANU using the same means Moi had so successfully employed for over a dec-
ade. Despite its very high PNS, one should note that NARC was probably the prototype of a 
multi-ethnic alliance party: It always saw itself as an alliance of individual parties, each of 
which continued to remain in existence. Its candidates agreed to contest the election on a 
NARC ticket, yet its member parties did not dissolve (Kadima and Owuor 2006). Through-
out the 2002 campaign all NARC leaders on various occasions spelled out the purpose of the 
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alliance: to remove KANU from power. Its quick disintegration after the 2002 election fur-
ther confirms the view of NARC as an alliance party. Its performance illustrates the party’s 
strongholds: It did well in those regions where its various leaders hailed from. NARC’s im-
pressive performance in the Rift Valley is the result of many Kalenjin leaders’ defection from 
Moi and their belief that a political reorientation was necessary. 
3.3.3 From Fusion to Fluidity: Kenya since 2003 
In recent years Kenya’s political system has experienced a further transformation, which has 
seen a further restructuring of the party system into a state of fluidity, with constantly 
changing party structures and party affiliations. This has made Kenyan politics increasingly 
unpredictable and, further, has at times even made it impossible to determine whether par-
ties are in or out of government. 
KANU’s departure from power resulted in further losses of support: Shortly after the 2002 
election, former vice-president Mudavadi ditched the party, further undermining the party’s 
support base in Western Province.43 In the years leading up to the most recent elections in 
December 2007, KANU was split down the middle between the Uhuru (Kikuyu) camp and a 
faction rallied around KANU’s new secretary-general, Nicolas Biwott (Kalenjin). In January 
2005 Kenyatta defeated Biwott in KANU’s national party elections for the position of party 
chairman, which caused the latter to build up a parallel party in the Rift Valley (also called 
“New KANU”).44 KANU’s 2005 party elections did represent a new beginning and once 
more reflected Kenyan society as a whole.45 However, in the following months KANU con-
tinued to be deeply divided between the Kenyatta and Ruto (Kalenjin) camps. Ruto, a life-
long ally of Moi and a longtime KANU powerhouse, continued to challenge Kenyatta’s posi-
tion. In doing so Ruto found the support of that part of the Kalenjin establishment which 
had remained inside the party.46
Simultaneously, the situation inside NARC proved to be at least equally difficult. The sec-
ond most important factor holding NARC together, after its members’ jointly held belief that 
KANU had to be removed from power, was the common goal of initiating constitutional re-
forms, which would ultimately result in the creation of a strong prime minister. After over a 
decade of various rounds of constitutional debates, the Constitution of Kenya Review Com-
mission (CKRC) outlined its reform proposals shortly before the 2002 elections. In its docu-
ment it put forward many far-reaching changes which would have fundamentally altered 
Kenya’s institutional setup. Among other things, the commission proposed a bicameral na-
tional assembly, a mixed-member proportional electoral system, the demotion of the presi-
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dency to a merely ceremonial post, the introduction of a strong prime minister, and the im-
plementation of a federal system (majimboism).47 While KANU’s exact position on the con-
stitutional reforms was difficult to pin down,48 NARC wholeheartedly supported them. 
Thus, constitutional reform was the only genuine policy issue which had brought NARC to-
gether. The memorandum of understanding between its two main participating parties 
(NAK and the LDP) foresaw a 50/50 power-sharing formula between NAK and the LDP 
with regard to cabinet membership as well as the promise that Raila would be made prime 
minister once the post was established (Kadima and Owuor 2006). Accordingly, Kibaki’s 
first cabinet included members from all of Kenya’s major ethnic groups: Kikuyus, Luhyas, 
Luos, Kalenjins, and Kambas. Once more, however, the logic of Kenyan party politics was 
shining through: Contrary to Kibaki’s election promises, no immediate constitutional 
changes were on the horizon. In response, Raila’s LDP announced in September 2004 that it 
would contest the 2007 election outside the NARC coalition (Kadima and Owuor 2006). 
What led to further instability within the NARC were the increasingly tense relations be-
tween FORD-K and the LDP. After Wamalwa’s death in September 2003, Kibaki appointed 
Moodi Awori, another Luhya, as his new Vice-President. This provoked tension between 
FORD-K and the LDP as Awori was not only a Luhya but also a leading LDP figure.49 With 
FORD-K MP Musikari Kombo emerging as the new FORD-K leader, an intense political 
fight developed between the two parties over the Luhya vote and political domination in 
Western Province.50 On various occasions the new FORD-K leader denounced Awori and 
LDP Luhya minister Mudavadi as traitors of the Luhya. Other prominent FORD-K MPs 
such as Soita Shitanda and Bonny Khalwale explicitly warned LDP leaders not to enter 
Western Province as it was “owned” by FORD-K.51
In the months preceding and following the 2005 constitutional referendum, Kenya’s political 
parties, both in government and in the opposition, underwent alterations. For the purpose of 
the referendum, the LDP faction of NARC teamed up with parts of KANU and formed the 
“no” camp together with Ngilu’s National Party of Kenya (formerly SDP). This side cam-
paigned under the banner of an orange and opposed Kibaki’s constitutional bill, which con-
tained a strong executive presidency. The DP, FORD-K, FORD-P, and the many smaller par-
ties which had originally made up NAK came together in the “yes” camp, campaigning un-
der the banner of a banana. Table 10 summarizes the shifting political alliances before and 
after the referendum. 
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Table 10: Political Changes Immediately after the 2005 Referendum 
Pre 2005 Referendum Post 2005 Referendum 
Government alliance: NARC 
Member parties: FORD-K, DP,  
NPK (formerly SDP) and 11 smaller parties
Government alliance: NARC-K 
Member parties: FORD-K, FORD-P, DP,  
KANU (Kenyatta) plus smaller parties 
Opposition: KANU, FORD-P Opposition: ODM-K 
Member parties: LDP, KANU (Ruto), NPK 
Source: Author’s compilation from various media reports. 
Following a humiliating defeat in the referendum, Kibaki called for a government of na-
tional unity and appointed prominent members of KANU and FORD-P into government, 
now known under the label of NARC-Kenya. His post-2005 cabinet again contained many 
former DP figures associated with GEMA and Jomo Kenyatta’s post-independence political 
elite; its overall composition clearly showed a strong bias for Central Province and the Ki-
kuyu.52 Shortly before the 2007 elections Kibaki decided to contest them under yet another 
label, the Party of National Unity, an umbrella organization of all the political parties cam-
paigning for his re-election. 
Once more Raila Odinga became the leader of the country’s opposition, now known under 
the label of Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K). Neither NARC-K nor ODM-K 
proved to be particularly stable in the run-up to the 2007 elections. For once it was not clear 
on which side FORD-K would eventually end up. Party leader Kombo (Luhya) allegedly 
worked towards a FORD-K–LDP alliance in order to boost the party’s chances in Western 
Province. His inner-party rival Kitui (Luhya), who had stood against him in the party lead-
ership contest after Wamalwa’s death, advocated the opposite and favored the backing of 
Kibaki.53 In late December, FORD-K finally fell apart when 12 of its MPs declared the forma-
tion of a new party, New FORD-K. Additionally, although KANU had been allocated a min-
istry in the cabinet, it remained officially inside the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya. It 
was at times unclear whether KANU as a party was in opposition or in government; the 
Kalenjin wing of the party advocated the former, and the Kenyatta (Kikuyu) wing promoted 
the latter.54 On the opposition side, ODM-K split over the question of who would be Kibaki’s 
challenger in the 2007 elections. The personal rivalry between Raila Odinga (Luo) and Ka-
lonzo Musyoka (Kamba) proved too much for the party to withstand. On August 14, 2007, 
the Raila camp broke away and formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).55 Of the 
two groups, the ODM included a far greater number of the country’s leading Kibaki oppo-
nents including former foreign minister Mudavadi (Luhya) and former Moi ally William 
Ruto (Kalenjin). Table 11 displays the lineup of personalities in the top two parties contest-
ing the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. 
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Table 11: Main Alliances in the 2007 Elections 
Presidential Candidate Kibaki (Kikuyu) Odinga (Luo) 
Party Party of National Unity Orange Democratic Movement 
Main Member Parties  DP, FORD-K, FORD-P, KANU  
(Kenyatta/Moi), New Kanu (Biwott)
LDP, KANU (Ruto) 
Influential Figures Moody Awoi (Luhya) 
Musikari Kombo (Luhya) 
Nicolas Biwott (Kalenjin) 
Symon Nyachae (Kisii) 
Musalia Mudavai (Luhya) 
William Ruto (Kalenjin) 
Charity Ngilu (Kamba) 
Najib Balala (Coastal) 
Source: Author’s compilation from various media reports. 
4 Conclusion: Parties and Party Systems in Kenya 
This study has proven that all of Kenya’s politically significant parties represent Horowitz’s 
coalitions of convenience or commitment. Accordingly, all significant political parties in 
Kenya between 1992 and 2007 represent ethnic parties. Though the country’s dominant eth-
nic cleavages were at times overcome, these periods proved to be short-lived and tactically 
motivated. As a result, the return of multiparty democracy in Kenya has exacerbated the 
country’s dominant ethnic cleavages, in particular the division between the Kikuyu and the 
Luo people. In addition, ethnicity has consistently proven to provide a stronger rallying 
ground for political activity than party structures. This is true of both opposition and gov-
ernment: The disintegration of KANU, once out of power, and NARC, once in power, illus-
trate this. The case of NARC is especially interesting for the study of African politics as the 
literature on neopatrimonialism assumes that governments provide stability by creating cli-
entelistic networks of power. The immediate downfall of NARC, however, proves that eth-
nicity is the stronger of the two forces: access to state resources was not a sufficient condi-
tion to overcome the centrifugal powers of ethnicity. 
The widely covered incidents of post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 are further 
outcomes of the type of political party which is omnipresent in the country. Post-electoral 
violence with heavy ethnic undertones also occurred in the post-election environments of 
1992 and 1997. Thus, the peaceful and much heralded 2002 election represented an exception 
and not a turning point, as some have argued, in Kenyan electoral history (Muthai 2005). The 
fact that the 2002 election was won by an alliance which (though only temporarily) bridged 
all the country’s past and present cleavages suggests a causal relationship between electoral 
violence and the type of party in place. Again, this has consequences for the study of African 
politics as a whole: While for Kenya the 2007 election represents a step back in terms of po-
litical stability and electoral conduct, it also raises the question of the feasibility of peaceful 
elections in multi-ethnic countries in which ethnicity dominates party politics. 
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Annex: The Various Processes of Political Reconstruction in Kenya 
Table A1: Parties and Their Constituent Ethnicities, 1993 to 1998 
Party (Foundation Year) Constituent Ethnicities 
DP (1992) Kikuyu, Kambas, Masai 
DP (1997) Kikuyu,  
FORD (1991) All major communities 
FORD-A (1992) Kikuyu, Luhya 
FORD-K (1992) All major communities 
FORD-K (1995) Luo, Luhya 
FORD-K (1997) Luhya 
KANU Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Masai
NDP (1997) Luo 
SDP (1996) Kamba 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Table A2: Parties and Their Constituent Parties, 1998 to 2007 
Party (Foundation Year) Constituent Parties 
NAK (2002) DP, FORD-K, NKP (SDP) plus several smaller parties 
NARC (2002) NAK, LDP 
PNU (2007) DP, FORD-K, KANU ODM (2005), LDP, KANU (Ruto), NPK 
New KANU (1999) KANU+NDP 
KANU (2002) KANU (2002) 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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